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Abstract
This paper will discuss the bonds and boundaries a researcher must 
take into consideration when attempting to show links between 
intellectual history (or history of theory) and real historical events. 
Specifically, it will focus on the methodological considerations of a 
research project that is attempting to establish connections between 
academic International Relations theory, political ideology, and world 
history in the 20th century. The two main difficulties obvious from 
the outset in attempting to create such links are that the subject area 
is a) almost impossibly vast and b) deals largely in the abstract realm 
of contending ideological worldviews. As such, a rigorous, astute and 
highly selective methodological approach must be carefully applied if 
the resulting argument is to be of real academic value. 
This paper, therefore, explores how to navigate specific boundaries and 
limitations such as a) the limited ability to make direct assessments of 
causality, b) the boundaries between different epistemological or ontological 
worldviews in their interpretations of the ‘same’ historical events, and c) 
the difficulties of situating a given worldview within its own historical 
context. Without a disciplined focus on the issues above it would be easy, 
given the ethereal nature of the subject area, to falter into generalisations 
or ideological partisanship that would render the argument practically 
meaningless. It concludes by discussing why an explicitly historical 
approach is the most suited to dealing with the project at hand.
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Introduction
This paper will discuss some of the main methodological issues faced during 
the first year of my PhD research project, the broad aim of which is to explore 
the bonds and boundaries between academic International Relations theory, 
theories of psychology, and core moments of international-political history in 
the 20th century. The paper will describe the various stages that led me to settle 
on an explicitly historical approach for the project. These stages will include: 
1) a general summary of the initial idea, involving the original perception of 
a clear problem in International Relations scholarship. This summary will 
briefly discuss aspects of the history of academic International Relations 
theorizing, with a focus on the field’s often superficial incorporation of different 
psychological theories; 2) a summary of a first attempt towards developing a 
coherent methodological approach for research. This will discuss the attempt to 
directly redefine the established theoretical categories of academic International 
Relations and the inherent challenges of doing so; and 3) a summary of a 
second methodological approach for research. This will focus on some of 
the advantages of a historical approach, as well as some of the limitations 
necessarily implied. 
The overarching aim for this paper, therefore, is to outline why I have 
settled on a historical methodology as the most suitable for a research project 
straddling the nebulous boundaries between ideology, psychology, history, 
and politics. In doing so, the paper will touch on various on-going debates in 
historical theory, academic International Relations, and psychology. 
Part 1) A Fundamental Problem in IR theory 
The idea of International Relations or International Politics as its own 
academically institutionalised subject area is a relatively recent development. 
After WWII, with US government sponsorship, there was a gathering of some 
of the most prominent intellectuals on international affairs from the allied 
countries. The explicit aim was to develop a research agenda that would help 
avoid catastrophic global conflicts as had been seen in the Great Wars of the 
first half of the twentieth century. It has been argued that this meeting was the 
starting point of what we now recognise as International Relations scholarship 
in its present form, at least within an Anglo-American context.1 At present, 
most prominent universities across the UK and the USA have departments or 
faculties that engage with the theorists and theories that emerged from this 
historical beginning to ‘International Relations theory’.
The contrived and exclusive nature of the field’s origins set a precedent for 
it to be dominated by a few core conceptions about the nature of the political 
world. As a result, the field has historically suffered from a paralysing myopia 
with regards to what should be the focus of its study, as well as regarding why 
and how such elements should be addressed. A particularly striking example is 
the total absence of consideration given to even the most basic ideas of human 
psychology by entire schools of International Relations theory. Indeed, many of 
the core schools forming the academic history of International Relations theory 
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could be scrutinised for their underlying psychological foundations. However, 
the neo-realist and neo-liberal fields, which have dominated the field from the 
late 1970s, stand out as the most problematic for two main reasons.2  Firstly, the 
psychological assumptions at the basis of their theoretical models, characterised 
by certain core propositions about human psychology, were highly questionable. 
For example, these theories explicitly held that human beings exclusively act 
rationally, in their own self-interest, and with survival or the accumulation of 
power as their central concern. Psychologists of multiple different theoretical 
backgrounds would argue against each of these propositions. Secondly, the 
fact that these theories have been so dominant throughout the history of 
International Relations, as well as being those most closely associated with 
high-level policy making, made their flaws stand out as more problematic. 
Where other theories of International Relations may implicitly or explicitly be 
relying on psychology that is questionable in different ways, they were both 
less dominant (and arguably less influential) and less explicitly connected with 
policy than the neo-realist and neo-liberal theories in IR. 
In combination, the two above factors are not insignificant. Indeed, the fact 
that theories almost exclusively dominating IR thinking from the late seventies 
until the early nineties (and are still prominently taught today) were built on 
the most questionable theoretical foundations seems inherently dissatisfactory. 
Furthermore, the prescriptive or advisory aspect to the neo-realist or neo-
liberal projects, explicitly trying to promote themselves as practical or useable 
models for political decision-making, imply that these theories might more 
readily have exerted a concrete political influence than perhaps other less ready-
to-use, competitor theories. In short, there is a distinct sense that the neo-realist 
and neo-liberal theories were somehow providing a paint-by-numbers picture 
of world politics, designed explicitly for policy makers, with the use of highly 
problematic psychology. 
Other questions arose when considering how many policy-makers, high-
level government officials, foreign affairs editors and military chiefs of today 
were schooled in such theory and knew little else. Does believing and applying 
theories based on such a survivalist view of human psychology make adherents, 
and the foreign policy affected, more aggressive, callous, and dangerous? If a 
military chief or foreign secretary sees the world’s nations as an unruly, anarchic 
pack of survival ‘units’, each looking to secure power and supremacy over their 
neighbours in a dog-eat-dog global fight to the death, what sort of foreign 
relations will be the likely result? How many people could be, and arguably have 
already been, affected? To anyone unfamiliar with the field, this characterisation 
of the neo-realist and neo-liberal positions may seem hyperbolic. In truth, 
it is not an unfair reflection of the sort of terminology applied within these 
academically respected (within the field) bodies of work.3 
These concerns, then, form the core questions of a research project 
attempting to understand how, why, and when did these problematic theories 
emerge, as well as whether they can be connected to concrete international 
policy making and policy effects. The following sections of this paper will trace 
considerations on how best to approach these questions. 
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Part 2) First Methodology: Analytical Recategorisation
The first attempt to develop a research agenda looked to assess multiple theories 
from across the IR intellectual spectrum in terms of their understandings of 
human psychology. It purported to identify what psychological ideas various 
theorists included either explicitly or implicitly in their political theorising. The 
hoped-for outcome was that, once the analysis was completed, it would have 
been possible to identify new trends, groups, and consequences of particular 
understandings of psychology within IR theory. In an attempt to make the 
investigation as focused and specific as possible, the analysis specifically 
assessed the theories with regard to two core psycho-ontological questions.4 
The first was whether or not the theory’s view of psychology allowed for 
an unconscious aspect to the human mind, or whether human beings were 
considered to be wholly conscious and rational. The second was whether they 
took an ontologically dualistic or monistic position on the relation between 
mind and world. In other words, did the theories hold that there is an external, 
objective reality to world politics (and, indeed, life itself) which the mind tries 
to comprehend (dualism), or did they hold the world to be subjective and 
characterised as interrelated with the very process of intellectual theorising itself 
in a cyclical process of discursive creation and development (monism).
Such a line of inquiry initially seemed appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, 
by assessing the work of theories from across the IR spectrum specifically 
with regards to their psychological ontologies, it was proving possible to 
connect theorists from entirely different IR traditions in new ways. In other, 
words, theorists that are generally considered to be at odds about their broad 
models of how world politics functioned can actually be considered as being 
in general agreement based on their view of human psychology. The converse 
also proves to be the case, as theorists usually associated with the same ‘school’ 
can be shown to actually have been working with mutually incompatible 
psychological ontologies. This possibility to re-categorise the schools within 
IR scholarship (and, indeed, having a model to potentially do the same within 
related fields) at first appeared to be very encouraging. There seemed to be 
the potential for significant impact in debates over how the basic history and 
structure of the field should be considered. The second reason the approach 
seemed appropriate then was because if one isolated theories according to their 
particular psychologies, it would consequently be possible to directly scrutinize 
the reliability of their psychological understandings. This would be useful for 
inter-theoretical disputes about the validity or accuracy of positions being put 
forward.
 There are, however, three central problems with using this methodology. 
The first is that considering the theories in such a way is completely ahistorical. 
In other words, comparing how theories from completely different eras and 
contexts engage with notions like ‘the unconscious’ is somewhat artificial 
and overly presentist. The unconscious as understood in the early twentieth 
century is different to how the unconscious is defined in the early twenty-first. 
As a consequence, assessing the various theories according to any particular 
single fixed notion is too rigid an approach as it ignores how different theorists 
engaged with such concepts in their own intellectual contexts. Secondly, and 
connected to the first problem, there is no consensus within psychology (or 
anywhere) about the ‘true’ nature of the human mind. Attempting to assess 
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how ‘good’ the different historically prominent IR theories were on the basis 
of their psychological understandings is to assume that the theory from which 
my own criteria were derived is somehow authoritative. Finally, the approach is 
fundamentally flawed because it provides confused definitions of dualism and 
monism when compared with how these terms have been used throughout the 
history of philosophy. Philosophical dualism and monism are usually associated 
with the debate over whether human consciousness can be considered as 
dependent on or separate from the physical body,5 whereas my own definitions 
of dualism or monism were more related to epistemological debates on the 
objectivity or subjectivity of knowledge. 
In summary, on becoming aware of the combined weight of the above 
three problems within the research agenda, it was clear that a new or updated 
approach was necessary. The second, more successful attempt to define a 
research methodology suitable for the particular project will be discussed in the 
following section.
Part 3) Second Methodology: Intellectual History
A way to address all three of the flaws of analytical recategorisation is to switch 
to a more strictly historical approach. This perspective has several benefits, 
not least that it allows the IR theorists under scrutiny to be placed within the 
intellectual context of their day, thus engaging with the various theories in 
question on their own terms. As well as avoiding conflation between different 
understandings of concepts in the present and the past, it actually allows 
these differences and developments of meaning to come to light and become 
objects of interest in their own right. Moreover, the historical approach does 
not require a fully developed and defendable psychological position of its own. 
Rather, it tries to engage objectively with a more descriptive, almost narrative 
view of historical developments within IR and avoids judging them according 
to any particular criteria. A further benefit of this is that, by not supporting any 
particular partisan argument, the history of the matter in question (for example, 
the historical record of particular theories of International Relations) is allowed 
to speak for itself.
This approach has had demonstrable benefits, for example, in consideration 
the work of EH Carr (a key figure within twentieth century academic 
International Relations). Via an in depth assessment of his biographical 
work in the 1930s, leading up to the publication of his cornerstone IR text 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis in 1939, it has been possible to firmly locate Carr 
within the context of early twentieth century trends in psychological theory.6 
In brief, the main intellectual currents which fundamentally shaped Carr’s 
understanding on human psychology include developments in: evolutionary 
theory; crowd psychology; romantic and pragmatic philosophy; sociology; 
and various forms of psychoanalytic theory.7 The value of this detailed 
inquiry into Carr’s intellectual setting is that it provides further insight into 
his political theory. Having this knowledge for a number of the core theorists 
from throughout the history of IR theory will allow for a more coherent and 
comprehensive understanding of how and why IR scholarship developed in the 
sometimes seemingly problematic or unexpected way it did. Furthermore, if 
any correlation can be found between particular political theories and concrete 
policy outcomes, it would allow a logical connection to be made between 
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different understandings of human psychology and implied or expected 
political outcomes when these are present. 
In short, the historical approach is an effective and coherent methodology to 
investigate some of the interrelations between academic International Relations 
theory, psychology, and international politics. In addition, its downsides appear 
relatively minor and manageable. For example, a main methodological issue in 
historical theory is that it is arguably impossible to develop a fully impartial or 
objective perspective. Any historian has to decide what to consider ‘historically 
significant’, essentially based on personal preference about what to include and 
what to omit. The ‘facts’ of history, therefore, are decided to a greater or lesser 
extent by the bias of the historian. Consequently, the dilemma arises whether it 
is better to attempt to be as objective as possible or, conversely, be more explicit 
with one’s bias. Either way, however, if the research is backed up by evidence, 
organised into a logical narrative, and coherently engages with perspectives of 
related historical authorities, it is arguable that questions of bias and objectivity 
are of secondary importance. Indeed, the reader is free to make up his or 
her own mind on the matter. These unresolved methodological questions 
are longstanding and well known within the field of historical studies.8 Most 
importantly, they are manageable enough to not affect to the overall suitability 
of the historical approach within my research. The benefits certainly outweigh 
the negatives and consequently it appears to be appropriate for the project 
moving forward.
Conclusion
This paper has summarily discussed how my current PhD research project 
has developed from an initial idea into a project focusing on IR theory from 
a historical perspective. At present, this approach appears to be the most 
suitable for the research. By interconnecting historical developments in 
academic International Relations theory, intellectual trends in psychological 
theory, political uptake and implementation of these various currents, and 
the outcomes of their policy application, it will be possible to track how 
specific ideas have contributed to political realities. The historical approach 
certainly offers a straightforward and adaptable methodology for addressing 
the various bonds, boundaries, and degrees of abstraction involved in such an 
interdisciplinary project.
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